The Great Turf War of the New Millennium: Can Banks Engage in Real Estate Brokerage and Management Activities by Bishop, Harrison K.
NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 13
2002
The Great Turf War of the New Millennium: Can
Banks Engage in Real Estate Brokerage and
Management Activities
Harrison K. Bishop
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Harrison K. Bishop, The Great Turf War of the New Millennium: Can Banks Engage in Real Estate Brokerage and Management Activities, 6
N.C. Banking Inst. 391 (2002).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol6/iss1/13
The Great Tuff War of the New Millennium: Can Banks Engage
in Real Estate Brokerage and Management Activities?
When the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) finally
became the law of the land in 1999, the structure of financial
institutions changed.' Not only were banks, insurance companies,
and securities firms no longer prohibited from interacting vdth
each other, but perhaps more importantly, a whole new range of
previously forbidden activities appeared to meet the definition of
"financial in nature."2 Two such activities that bankers have long
wanted to engage in are real estate brokerage and real estate
management.3 Banks have felt hampered by the brokerage and
management prohibitions because brokerage and management are
a natural complement to the many other services that financial
institutions offer such as home mortgages, homeowner's insurance,
trust services, and real estate development
Shortly after the passage of GLBA, the Federal Reserve
proposed a new rule that would allow financial holding companies
(FHCs) to engage in real estate brokerage and management.' This
proposal quickly became the subject of a hotly contested battle
between the banking lobby and the powerful National Association
of Realtors (NAR).6 What on the surface appeared to be a
reasonable extension of powers granted by GLBA has become the
center of a campaign pitting groups one against the other:
This Note discusses the rule proposed by the Federal
Reserve and the conflicting sides of this lively debate. First, this
Note defines the rule proposal process and what it entails Next,
1. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified at scattered sections of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C.). Under GLBA, bank holding
companies are able to become financial holding companies, opening the door to a
more diversified line of business. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(1) (20Uo).
2. See infra note 16.
3. See infra notes 50-77 and accompanying text.
4. A.i BANicERs ASS'N, OPEN THE DOOR To MORE REAL ESTATE
COMPErION (2001) [hereinafter OPENTHE DOOR].
5. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 370-03
(proposed Jan. 3,2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
6. See infra notes 50-99 and accompanying text.
7. Id.
S. See infra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
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this Note lists the factors regulators must examine in determining
whether to promulgate a proposed rule.9 The following section
discusses the current, undecided rule proposal, what changes may
result from it, and what entities are on each side of the issue.1
This Note then addresses the beliefs and concerns of the proposed
rule's proponents," followed by the opponents' arguments.'
Finally, this Note discusses the most likely regulatory analysis of
the proposal and what the future may hold for real estate
brokerage and management. 3
I. THE PROCESS
GLBA became effective on March 11, 2000. "By tearing
down the legal barriers between commercial banking, investment
banking and insurance, it was thought that [GLBA] would lead to
dramatic new efficiencies, the rise of huge financial conglomerates,
exciting new financial products and substantial savings to
consumers."1 4 In relevant part, GLBA allows financial holding
companies to engage in any activity that is "financial in nature or
incidental to such financial activity... [or is] complementary to a
financial activity and does not pose a substantial risk to the safety
or soundness of depository institutions or the financial system
generally."15 These terms of art have led to much debate about
what business practices are allowable for FHCs.' 6
9. See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 30-49 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 50-77 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 78-99 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 100-156 and accompanying text.
14. THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis, ONE YEAR AFTER GRAMM-
LEACH-BLILEY: ARE WE MODERN YET? (2001), at http://www.stls.frb.org/
publications/cb/2001/a/pages/ p3-articlel.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2002).
15. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2000).
16. See infra notes 30-99 and accompanying text. GLBA changed the standard
for authorizing new activities. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and
Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Fin. Serv., 107th Cong., 66-67 (May 2, 2001)
(statement of Laurence H. Meyer, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys.) [hereinafter Meyer].
One thing that is clear is that Congress intended the 'financial in
nature' test to be broader than the previous test for authorizing
new activities for bank holding companies under the Bank Holding
Company Act. Before passage of [GLBA], bank holding
392 [Vol. 6
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Congress knew it was ill-equipped to promulgate rules for
every issue affecting the banking, securities, and insurance
industries; therefore, it enacted a provision in GLBA allowing the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors (hereinafter "the Secretary and Board") to issue rule
proposals and determine whether an activity is permissible under
GLBA. 7 Industry groups or entities may request a determination
as to whether an activity is permissible under GLBA by submitting
a proposal to the Board of Governors." Also, -[t]he Secretary of
the Treasury may, at any time, recommend in writing that the
Board [of Governors] find an activity to be financial in nature or
incidental to financial activity."' 9 The Secretary and Board must
be in agreement as to whether an activity is permissible under
GLBA. 0 They may seek public comment on any rule proposal. 2'
companies were permitted to engage only in activities that the
Board determined were 'closely related to banking.' The closely
related to banldng test was tied to the activities of banks. In
considering whether an activity w.as closely related to banking, the
courts focused on three factors: (i) whether banks conduct the
proposed activity. (ii) whether banks provide services that are
operationally or functionally similar to the proposed services, and
(iii) whether banks provide services that are so integrally related to
the proposed services as to require their provision in a specialized
form. The text and legislative history of [GLBA] indicate that
Congress intended the new 'financial or incidental' standard to
represent a significant expansion of the old 'closely related to
banking' standard.
Id. at 67-68. "Complementary activities are non-financial activities that are related to
or complement financial activities." Id. at 66.
17. See K'AREN COUCH ET AL, FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, B.NKS AS RELMx
ESTATE BROKERS-LETTING FREE ENTERPRISE WORK, SOUTHWEST ECONOMY 1
(May 1, 2001), available at http:/ldalasfed.orgihtmfpubzjpdf5swelswe013.pdf, at 2
(last visited Feb. 2, 2002). "By delegating to the regulatory agencies the
responsibilities to resolve certain issues, Congress recognized the need to keepfinancial regulation responsive to the changng environment and aclrovdedged the
agencies' technical expertise in this area." Id. at 2; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1S43.
18. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2)(A)(i) (2100).
19. Id § 1543(k)(2)(B)(i).
20. Id § 1843(k)(2)(A)(ii).
2L Id. § 1843(k)(2)(B)(ii). "We recognize that, hard as we regulators try to
foresee and address potential issues raised by our regulatory actions, we can benefit
from the information and thinking of others. Our final rules often include significant
modifications as a result of the comments we received on the proposed rules."
Meyer, supra note 16. at 69.
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Under GLBA, the Secretary and Board must take several
factors into consideration when deciding whether an activity is
"financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity"22 or
"complementary to a financial activity. 23 These factors include:
(A) the purposes of [Chapter 17 of GLBA] and the
[entire] Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act;
(B) changes or reasonably expected changes in the
marketplace in which financial holding companies
compete;
(C) changes or reasonably expected changes in the
technology for delivering financial services; and
(D) whether such activity is necessary or
appropriate to allow a financial holding company
and the affiliates of a financial holding company
to-
i. compete effectively with any company seeking to
provide financial services in the United States;
ii. efficiently deliver information and services that
are financial in nature through the use of
technological means, including any application
necessary to protect the security or efficacy of
systems for the transmission of data or financial
transactions; and
iii. offer customers any available or emerging
technological means for using financial services or
for the document imaging of data. 4
GLBA also lists activities that are considered "financial in nature."
Those relevant to this discussion are as follows:
(A) Lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for
others, or safeguarding money or securities.
(B) Insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying against
loss, harm, damage, illness, disability, or death, or
providing and issuing annuities, and acting as
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2000).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 1843(k)(3).
394 [Vol. 6
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principal, agent, or broker for purposes of the
foregoing, in any State.
(C) Providing financial, investment, or economic
advisory services, including advising an investment
company....
(D) Issuing or selling instruments representing
interests in pools of assets permissible for a bank to
hold directly.
(E) Underwriting, dealing in, or making a market in
securities ....
After assessment of the proposed activity, the Secretary and Board
must issue a final rule declaring whether the activity is "financial in
nature" and thus permissible under GLBA.2'
On December 19, 2001, the Secretary and Board
determined that "finder activities" are financial in nature.' Finder
activities include "bringing together one or more buyers and
sellers of any product or service for transactions that the parties
themselves negotiate and consummate." '' Any future activities
deemed permissible by the Secretary and Board would be added
to the list contained in Regulation Y."'
II. CURRENT PROPOSAL AT ISSUE
On January 3, 2001, the Secretary and Board published a
proposed rule and a request for public comment on whether real
estate brokerage is an activity that is financial in nature, or
incidental to such financial activity " Comment was also sought on
whether real estate management activities could be considered
25. Id. § 1843(k)(4).
26. Id. § 1843(k)(2)(B)(ii).
27. See Meyer, supra note 16, at 66. The Secretary and Board were also asked to
more specifically define some financial terms and "determine that certain types of
expanded data processing activities are complementary to financial activities." Id.
The expanded data processing functions have been added to the list of acceptable
activities. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y), 12
C.F.R. § 225.86(d) (2001).
28. 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(d)(1).
29. 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(d). "Regulation Y" is the name of the section that lists
acceptable activities for FHCs. Id.
30. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control. 66 Fed. Reg. 307-03
(Jan. 3,2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
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financial in nature, or incidental to such financial activity.3' The
proposed rule would allow FHCs to participate in both areas of the
market.32 The original comment period closed on March 2, 2001.33
"Because of the significant public interest in the proposal," the
deadline was extended to May 1, 2001.' The Secretary and Board
received nearly 75,000 comment letters, which is more than double
the previous record.35
The Secretary and Board's proposal concerning real estate
brokerage was spurred by the request of three major trade
associations. 6 The American Bankers Association, prevalent
among those who support the rule proposal, also requested a
determination about real estate management.37 The Secretary and
Board are willing to consider each activity independent of one
another.38 Real estate management "is the business of providing
for others daily management of real estate. This can include
procuring tenants; negotiating leases; maintaining security
deposits; billing and collecting rents; accounting; making principal,
interest, insurance, tax and utilities payments; and overseeing
inspection, maintenance and upkeep of real property., 39  These
functions are subject to traditional state laws and regulations.40
Real estate brokerage is defined as "the business of bringing
together parties involved in a real estate transaction (purchase,
sale, exchange, lease or rental) and negotiating a contract."'" This
activity includes "acting as agent; listing and advertising; locating
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Meyer, supra note 16, at 65.
35. Dean Anason, Realtor Group Fighting to Keep Banks off its Turf, AM.
BANKER, June 8, 2001, at 4. The previous record was held by a defunct anti-money-
laundering plan proposed more than two years ago known as "know your customer."
Id.
36. Meyer, supra note 16, at 68. The three major associations are the American
Bankers Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, and the New York Clearing
House Association. Id.
37. Id.
38. Telephone interview with Mark Van Der Weide, Counsel, Board of
Governors, Federal Reserve System (January 3, 2002) [hereinafter Van Der Weide
Interview]. "There are many possible outcomes. One is that we would approve one
activity but not the other." Id.
39. Couch, supra note 17, at 9.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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buyers, sellers, lessors and lessees; conveying information;
providing advice; negotiating price; and administering the
closing., 4 2 If approved for FHCs, all of these functions would be
conducted pursuant to state licensing laws just as are imposed on
traditional real estate firms.43 The proposal does not seek to allow
FHCs to engage in real estate investment or real estate
development.4
There are two distinct viewpoints on this proposal.45 There
are those who believe FHCs should be able to compete against
real estate brokers in the open market.'C Proponents of the rule
proposal believe this will help all those involved with real estate
transactions.47 On the other side, there are those who contend
separation of these types of enterprises is essential.4!3 These
opponents think any type of integration could lead to enormous
problems.49
EII. PROPONENTS OF THE PROPOSED RULE
The American Bankers Association, the Financial Services
Roundtable, and the New York Clearing House Association are
the most visible supporters of adding real estate brokerage and
management to the list of available activities for FHCs.s  Led by
the American Bankers Association, they have put forth several
justifications for the addition.51
42. 1&
43. See generally OPEN THE DOOR, supra note 4.
44. I&
45. See generally Julie Kosterlitz, Bankers, Realtors in a Dereg Dustup, THE
NAT'L J., Feb. 24, 2001, at 570; Rob Blackwell, Rcaln, Brokers Unmoved by ABA
Official's Overture, AM. BANRER, July 25, 2001, at 3: Ronald E. Roel, Buyers and
Cellars: Real Estate Industry Battles Large Banks, NEWSDV, Feb. 23, 2001, at C3:
Jane Seccombe, Bankers Want to Offer Real Estate Services, NI1N.s'ON-S.xEi J., Apr.
3, 2001, at D1; David Smith, Proposal on Banks, Real Estate Under Attack, AR.
DEMiOCRAT-GAZETrE, Mar. 19, 2001, at ID; Audrey Y. Williams, Industry Fights
Bank's Push to Sell Real Estate, CHARLoTrE OBSERVER, Mar. 9,2001, at ID.
46. See infra notes 50-77 and accompanying text.
47. Id.
48. See infra notes 78-99 and accompanying text.
49. Id.
50. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 52-77 and accompanying text.
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A. One stop shopping for consumer convenience
First, the proponents of the rule (collectively "the ABA")
assert that consumers will be advantaged in that "one-stop
shopping" will, at the consumer's discretion, make buying a home
an easier, simplified transaction. 2 They feel the unnecessary
hassle of using several entities to complete a real estate purchase
will be diminished and make for a happier consumer. 3
B. Consumer protection will not be affected by the proposed
rule
Second, the ABA maintains that consumer protection will
increase by allowing FHCs to compete in the real estate market.'
It points out that FHCs "are subject to stronger consumer
protections and anti-tying provisions" than are conventional real
estate and mortgage companies. These protections include
privacy regulations under GLBA not applicable to mortgage
companies. 6
52. The Financial Services Roundtable, Letter to Congress Regarding the
Approval of Real Estate Brokerage as a Financial Activity is in the Public Interest
(Feb. 16, 2001), at http://fsround.org/Jointrealestatecongltr.html [hereinafter The
Financial Services Roundtable] (last visited Oct. 20, 2001).
53. Id.
54. OPEN THE DOOR, supra note 4.
55. Press Release, American Bankers Association, Dispelling the
Misrepresentations of the Real Estate Industry, at http://www.aba.com/Press+Room/
brokerage050101.htm [hereinafter Dispelling the Misrepresentations] (last visited
Feb. 23, 2002). "Existing anti-tying provisions would prohibit a bank from extending
credit, furnishing any service, or varying the consideration for any loan or service on
the condition that the customer obtain real estate brokerage services from the bank's
[real estate] affiliate... [t]he same rules, however, do not apply to realtors affiliated
with mortgage companies." Id.; see also Testimony before the Subcomm. of Fin. Inst.
and Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Fin. Serv., 107th Cong. (May 2, 2001)
(statement of Treasury Acting Under Secretary Donald V. Hammond) (stating
viewpoints about the proposed rule) [hereinafter Hammond].
56. Dispelling the Misrepresentations, supra note 55. Currently, none of the
privacy or anti-tying rules are applicable to real estate brokerage companies. OPEN
THE DOOR, supra note 4. If real estate brokerage were found to be financial in
nature, traditional real estate brokers may be subject to all of the privacy restrictions
under GLBA which include a written privacy policy and opt-out information sharing
provisions for all customers. Id. "[I]n his Dec. 21 [2002] letter, [House Energy and
Commerce Committee Chairman] Rep. [W.J.] Tauzin said that if real estate
brokerage is labeled a financial business, real estate firms may have to comply with
Gramm-Leach-Bliley's privacy rules." Washington People, AM. BANKER, Jan. 7,
[Vol. 6
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The ABA also contends that allowing FHCs to participate
in real estate brokerage and management will not affect soundness
risks for banks.57 The rationale is that GLBA proscribes financial
requirements of banks in order for them to qualify as FHCs so that
they may deal in activities the Secretary and Board find acceptable
under Regulation Y."' Among the requirements under GLBA are
that FHCs are well managed and capitalized."9 In fact, by allowing
banks to participate in real estate brokerage activities and thereby
diversifying FHC income sources, safety may actually be
improved."0 This, in effect, could make an FHC more resilient to
market fluctuations in certain sectors of the economy' The
Chairman and CEO of Farmers and Merchants National Bank in
West Point, Nebraska stated, while testifying before the House
Financial Services Committee Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit Subcommittee, that "because brokerage and management
[of real estate] are agency activities, they pose no risk to the
soundness of the bank.,6 2 Agents do not take an equity position in
deals they broker and, therefore, encounter no significant financial
risk.
63
2002, at 5. For a description of the privacy requirements, see generally David W.
Roderer, Tentative Steps Toward Financial Privacy, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 209 (2600).
The privacy requirements are applicable to banks. OPEN THE DOOR, supra note 4.
Both FHCs and realtors, however, must be licensed. Id.
57. OPEN THE DOOR, supra note 4.
5S. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1).
59. All of the depository institution subsidiaries of bank holding companies must
be well capitalized and managed in order to be eligible for FHC status. 12 U.S.C. §
1843(l)(1)(B). The bank holding company must have filed "a declaration that the
company elects to be a financial holding company to engage in activities or acquire
and retain shares of a company that were not permissible for a bank holding
company to engage in or acquire before the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act ... ." Id., § 1843(l)(1)(c)(i). Furthermore, FHCs are not allowed to engage in
new GLBA activities if they have received a rating less than a -satisfactory record of
meeting community credit needs" upon its most recent esamination under the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. Id., § 1843(l)(2).
60. Dispelling the Misrepresentations, supra note 55.
61. Id.
62. AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, BANKS SELLING REAL ESTATE BENEFITS
CONSU.mRS AND MARKETPLACE, ABA TELLS CONGRESSIONAL COMMITEE (2001),
at http'J.ww-..aba.com/ Press+Roomnnr050201.htm [hereinafter American Bankers
Association] (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). Phillip Burns is the Chairman of Farmers
and Merchants National Bank. Id.; see also Hammond, supra note 55 (making a
statement similar to Burns').
63. OPEN THE DOOR, supra note 4.
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C. Competition will be increased by the proposed rule
Third, the ABA points out that integrated real estate firms,
such as Century 21, Coldwell Banker, and Long and Foster are
allowed to provide products including title insurance,
homeowner's insurance, and mortgage loans.' FHCs can perform
all of those functions but are shut out of the last component: real
estate brokerage. In order to increase competition, the ABA
believes FHCs should be allowed to offer these products.' In
theory, more competition would lead to higher efficiency and
better pricing and service levels.67  The ABA claims that
opponents of the proposed rule "want to stop competition, while
engaging in lending and brokerage themselves... [and] [t]hat's
disingenuous ... and wrong.'68
D. Real estate brokerage and management are a complement to
current business lines of FHCs
Fourth, the ABA claims that moving into this type of
industry would be only a small leap for FHCs. 69  "Banking
organizations engage in a wide variety of real estate-related
activities: real estate lending; real estate settlement and escrow
services; real estate investment advisory services; title insurance;
and commercial real estate equity financing. Brokerage activities
are just one more aspect of such traditional services., 70 The ABA
urges that buying a home is certainly financial in nature as
required by GLBA because it is one of the largest financial
transactions the average citizen is likely to participate in, and
mortgage payments are "just like an investment in an annuity or a
64. The Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 52; see also OPEN THE DOOR,
supra note 4 (listing prominent firms who engage in these activities).
65. OPEN THE DOOR, supra note 4.
66. See generally Dispelling the Misrepresentations, supra note 55.
67. The Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 52. Efficiency would be
increased because FHCs already deal in most of the other functions related to real
estate brokerage. See Hammond, supra note 55; see also OPEN THE DOOR, supra
note 4 (stating the ABA's position regarding efficiency).
68. Dispelling the Misrepresentations, supra note 55.
69. See generally Hammond, supra note 55.
70. Dispelling the Misrepresentations, supra note 55.
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stock" in that the underlying asset fluctuates in value over time.!'
Therefore, real estate brokerage and management are integral in
this process and should be a regular practice of FHCs!2
E. State markets and Congressional action indicate tile
proposed rule should be promulgated
Fifth, the ABA points out that "[r]eal estate brokerage and
property management by depository institutions are not new
issues. In fact, half of the states allow their state-chartered banks
to be involved in these activities today. Credit unions and federal
savings associations can also offer these services." 3 No conclusive
facts have shown that any adverse effects have come from these
allowances.
Arguably, if members of Congress wanted to disallow this
type of activity, they could have done it when they drafted
GLBA.74 Rather, it expressly granted the authority to determine
what activities are financial in nature to regulatory agencies7'
"The proposed rule incorporates every aspect of Congress'
objective [in passing GLBA]: additional choices for the consumer;
a more level playing field between banks and other financial
service providers; and increased competition in the real estate
brokerage industry."76 Equally vigorous are the arguments on the
other side of this issue.'
IV. OPPONENTS TO THE PROPOSED RULE
The National Association of Realtors (NAR) and its
partners do not want FHCs to be able to conduct real estate
brokerage and management activities, and have put forth several
71. Id.
72. OPENTHE DOOR, supra note 4.
73. Id.; see also Hammond, supra note 55, at 10 (testifying that many states allow
credit unions and federal saings associations to offer real estate services).
74. AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 62.
75. Dispelling the Misrepresentations, supra note 55.
76. Id.
77. See infra notes 78-99 and accompanying text.
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arguments against the proposal.7 s NAR has been extremely vocal
about its position.79
A. The proposed rule would affect consumer choice and reduce
competition
NAR believes that consolidation in the banking industry, if
this rule were put into place, would negatively affect consumer
choice and constrict competition by putting smaller firms out of
business."0 They feel that FHCs will have an unfair advantage in
the marketplace.8' NAR believes that entities with access to low
interest Federal Reserve funds should not be able to engage in
"selling property. 8 2  NAR has also said that FHCs special tax
treatment and other protections will allow them to take the real
estate market by force. 3 The concept of "tying" or forcing
consumers to use an entity's own products in order to be eligible
for certain rates or prices is a chief concern of realtors against the
78. See Steve Cook, Protection, Privacy Top Public Concerns Over Bank-Owned
Real Estate Brokerages NAR Survey Finds (Feb. 13, 2001), at http://nar.realtor.com/
news/2001Releases/February/21.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2001) [hereinafter
Protection, Privacy Top Public Concerns]; Steve Cook, NAR Letters Argue Against
Proposed Rule to Allow Banks Into Real Estate (May 1, 2001), at
http://nar.realtor.com/news/2001Releases/May/56.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2001)
[hereinafter NAR Letters Argue Against Proposed Rule]; Steve Cook, NAR President
Testifies Against Bankers Entering Real Estate (May 2, 2001), at
http://nar.realtor.com/news/2001Releases/May/57.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2001)
[hereinafter NAR President Testifies]; Anason, supra note 35, at 4; Blackwell, supra
note 45, at 320; Roel, supra note 45, at C3; Smith, supra note 45, at 1D.
79. Anason, supra note 35, at 4. In fact, NAR sent 50,000 letters to Congress in
opposition to the proposal. Id.
80. Blackwell, supra note 45, at 320.
81. Id.
82. Smith, supra note 45, at D1 (citing Bob Balhorn). Smith's use of the term
"selling property" is peculiar. Id. As an agent, FHCs would not take title to any real
estate they intend to broker. Hammond, supra note 55, at 10. Therefore, it is hard to
understand how access to Federal Reserve funds would be of any advantage. See id.
83. See Protection, Privacy Top Public Concerns, supra note 78. FHCs have
access to low interest Federal Funds and deposit insurance. Institute of Real Estate
Management, News Release: IREM Opposes Federal Reserve and Treasury
Department's Proposal to Redefine Real Estate Brokerage and Property Management
Activities as Financial in Nature (July 18, 2001), at http://www.irem.org/iO6_indres!
html/071801.html [hereinafter Institute of Real Estate Management] (last visited Feb.
2, 2002). FHCs, as highly regulated entities, are subject to different tax liabilities
than real estate brokers. Id.; see NAR President Testifies, supra note 78.
402 [Vol. 6
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proposal.' The opponents question the logic of allowing FHCs
"to entwine their fortunes so closely with another industry," ' 5 and
fear possible conflicts of interest. :
B. Real estate brokerage and management are not financial in
nature
Second, NAR also believes real estate brokerage is a
commercial activity rather than a financial one as required by
GLBA.87 NAR President Richard A. Mendenhall said:
Banking industry representatives say that because a
home is financed, real estate brokerage is incidental
to banldng. Banks have it backwards. It is the
mortgage that is, in fact, incidental to buying a
home. Let me put this in perspective. There are
two parties to every real estate transaction, a buyer
and a seller. The seller requires no financing for his
part of the transaction. Therefore, right off the bat,
fifty percent of the transacting parties handled by
real estate firms involve only the marketing and
selling of property. These sellers are not shopping
for a loan or any of the other lender services. The
other fifty percent represent the buying side. You
might assume all these homebuyers require a
84. Roel, supra note 45, at C3. But see Dispelling the Misrepresentations, supra
note 55 and accompanying text (insisting that regulations would prevent illegal t"ing
arrangements).
85. Roel, supra note 45, at C3.
86. NAR Letters Argue Against Proposed Rule, supra note 78.
87. GLBA does not allow FHCs to engage in unrelated, commercial activities.
See generally Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammarn, Overrieiv of the Granun-Leach-
Bliley Act, 4 N.C. BANIoNG INST. 1 (2000).
As a result of these expanded activities granted to financial
holding companies, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act effectively
permits affiliation between bank holding companies. insurance
companies, and securities firms, under the umbrella of a "financial
holding company." However... the Act continues to bar banking
and commerce affiliations, i.e., affiliations bet-ween depository
institutions and companies engaged in activities that are not
"financial in nature."
Id. at 5.
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mortgage. However, according to the American
Housing Survey, approximately twenty percent of
home purchases are made without financing ....
This means that this proposal, if adopted, places the
Federal Reserve in the embarrassing position of
permitting financial holding companies to engage in
a commercial activity where seventy percent of the
consumers involved in the transaction require no
financing at all.88
Although it is hard to make the math add up, the point raised by
the NAR is intriguing.89 Gramm-Leach-Bliley does not mandate
that FHCs should be involved in all activities.9" Rather, GLBA
serves the function of controlling FHC involvement in all aspects
of business. 91 Another argument advanced by NAR is that "real
estate is tangible" and "finance is paper."9" Therefore, real estate
is not financial in nature, and FHCs should not be allowed to
participate in the market.93 If real estate brokerage and
management are found to be financial in nature, FHCs would be
able to participate in any activity in commerce from "buying a
television set" to "the manufacture and sale of automobiles." 94
Perhaps far-fetched, NAR highlights a frightful possible trend.95
NAR has a stronger argument against the allowance of real
estate management.96 They point out that it "involves the overall
management of the property, from obtaining a good, qualified
tenant, to collecting rents, taking care of renovations and repairs,
hiring the best people for jobs from maintenance workers to
accountants, and dealing with any legal proceedings related to the
property."97  On a day-to-day basis, they claim, these activities
88. NAR President Testifies, supra note 78.
89. See id.
90. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2000).
91. Id.
92. Kosterlitz, supra note 45, at 570. NAR feels the fact that real estate can be
touched and finance cannot is a good indicator that real estate is not financial in
nature. Id. Therefore, tangibility could serve as a bright line test for whether an
activity is financial in nature. See id.
93. Id.
94. NAR Letters Argue Against Proposed Rule, supra note 78.
95. See id.
96. See infra notes 97-156 and accompanying text.
97. Institute of Real Estate Management, supra note 83.
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have nothing to do with a financial activity.3' Taken in this light,
GLBA would not allow FHCs to engage in these activities."'
V. CONCLUSION
As stated above, GLBA requires the Secretary and Board
to consider whether a proposed activity is financial in nature,
incidental to such activity., or is complementary to a financial
activity and whether it poses a substantial risk to the safety or
soundness of the United States financial system."" In addition, the
Secretary and Board are also to consider whether an activity is
necessary or appropriate so that financial entities are able to
"compete effectively."' 0 ' The ABA and NAR are each
determined that their viewpoint should become the rule.
Propaganda, such as consumer polls, has been implemented to
sway public and Congressional opinion. 2 Taken as a whole, the
stimuli for the polls are skewed and the results are largely
inconclusive. 3 Apparently, other methods of persuasion have
been more effective '4 The Secretary and Board have taken lots
of time to consider this issue."" This has given the powerful real
98. NAR Letters Argue Against Proposed Rule, supra note 78.
99. See ifrra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
100. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2000).
101. Id., § 1843(k)(3)(D).
102. See ifra note 103 and accompanying text.
103. OPEN THE DOOR, supra note 4. The ABA reports that only 18% of
consumers polled feel that they can find competitive prices for real estate. Id. It also
found that 69% of consumers feel if would be beneficial if banks offered mortgage
services and the same number felt they would get a better value for money spent on
the services. Id. According to another poll, the ABA found that 81,) feel that
private information would be better protected by FHCs. Id. NAR polls show that
33% of consumers feel that if the proposed rule is finalized, overall bank customer
service vill decline. Protection, Privacy Top Public Concerns. supra note 78. The
poll goes on to say that 57% of people felt that the proposal is too risky for FHCs and
"could lead to a repeat of the savings and loan crisis and the Asian financial crisis."
Id. Of the persons polled, NAR reports that 57% think that customers of FHC
mortgage companies would receive better rates on home loans and 53% "believe
bank-ovmed brokerages would be primarily interested in helping wealthy people buy
and sell homes, rather than first-time homebuyers and less well-off people." Id.
104. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
105. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control. 0 6 Fed. Reg. 307-03
(Jan. 3, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225). It has been more than one year
since the proposal was introduced. Id.
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estate lobby an opportunity to persuade many in Congress."' In
December of 2001, a bill was introduced in the House and Senate
designed to prevent FHCs from "direct or indirect real estate
brokerage or management."'0' 7 If passed, these measures would
disallow the Secretary and Board from making a decision as to
whether real estate brokerage and management are financial in
nature. 0 8 It is "unclear" when a decision on the proposed rule will
come. 9 The Secretary and Board have not offered any comment
as to whether the introduced legislation has had any delaying
effect on the decision."0 It is anticipated that it will be announced
sometime in 2002."' It is clear from Senator Gramm's comments
that he drafted GLBA to make sure that these types of decisions
are in the hands of the Secretary and Board."2 Unless the
proposed legislation becomes law, the Secretary and Board will
make the decision as mandated in GLBA." 3
There are several factors that indicate real estate brokerage
is financial in nature."' Other types of depository institutions
currently do business in this field." 5 FHCs themselves engage in
106. Protection, Privacy Top Public Concerns, supra note 78. The real estate
lobby is indeed powerful and active. Id. In 1999-2000, realtors gave $3.42 million in
campaign contributions as opposed to $1.65 million by bankers. Kent Hoover,
Realtors Fight Bankers Over Same Turf, THE Bus. J., Dec. 21, 2001, at 14.
107. R. Christian Bruce, Financial Institutions: Bank Group Urges Senate
Opposition to Legislation Banning Real Estate Powers, 77 Banking Daily (BNA) 636
(Dec. 20, 2001). In the Senate, the bill is known as the Community Choice in Real
Estate Act. Id. It was introduced by Senators Allard (R-CO.), Clinton (D-NY),
Shelby (R-AL), and Feingold (D-WI). Id. The House version is HR 3424. Id. It was
introduced by Representatives Calvert (R-CA), Kanjorski (D-PA), and LaTourette
(R-OH). Id.
108. Id.
109. Van Der Weide Interview, supra note 38.
110. Telephone interview with Mark Van Der Weide, Counsel, Board of
Governors, Federal Reserve System (Jan. 22, 2002) (second interview with Mark Van
Der Weide). "We are still working on [the decision] and there are lots of things we
are looking at." Id.
111. Van Der Weide Interview, supra note 38. "More likely than not, it will be
this year [2002]." Id.
112. Michelle Heller, DC Speaks: Gramm Calls GLB His Legacy; Gradual Impact
was 'Anticipated,' AM. BANKER, Nov. 9, 2001, at 1 (quoting Sen. Gramm). "I set up
(the law) for the regulatory process to generate an answer. I'm willing to live with
whatever the regulators decide based on the structure of the law." Id.
113. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2000).
114. See supra notes 52-77 and accompanying text.
115. Hammond, supra note 55, at 10.
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activities such as trust management that give them a certain
"expertise" in the field." 6 And, as stated above, a home purchase
is often the largest financial decision a person makes."" "Banks
and bank holding companies also engage in a variety of activities
that at first glance seem functionally and operationally similar to
real estate brokerage, including finder activities and securities and
insurance brokerage. " "S Finder activities were not found to be
financial in nature."1 Rather, they were found to be "incidental"
to a financial activity. "
By no stretch of the imagination, could the Secretary and
the Board consider real estate brokerage incidental to a financial
activity. Acting as a finder is similar to real estate brokerage.'"
Finders bring interested parties together for the purpose of
completing a financial transaction." If, as the ABA contends,
buying a home is indeed a financial transaction, it seems logical
that acting as a finder in order to facilitate such a financial
transaction would be incidental to that activity." Therefore, since
FHCs can engage in finder activities, they should be able to broker
real estate.' Finders are not allowed to take title to any property
bought or sold "through the finder service."'" This would sit well
with FHCs because real estate brokers do not take title to the real
estate they sell. 6 However, finder activities expressly disallow
finders from "engag[ing] in any activity that would require the
[FHC] to register or obtain a license as a real estate agent or
broker under applicable law."'27 The language would have to be
changed in the definition of "finder."'2  Regardless, that is less of
a challenge than having real estate brokerage itself declared
financial in nature.
116. Meyer, supra note 16, at 67, see also Couch, supra note 17, at 3; OPE4 THE
DOOR, supra note 4.
117. See generally Couch, supra note 17, OPEN THE DOOR, supra note 4.
118. Hammond, supra note 55, at 10; sce also OPEN THE Donn, supra note 4.
119. 12 C.F.R, § 225.S6(d) (2001).
120. 1l
121. See 12 C.F.RL § 225.86.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 52-77 and accompanying text.
124. OPEN THE DOOR, supra note 4.
125. Id
126. Hammond, supra note 55, at 10.
127. 12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2001).
128. Id
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Also, the Secretary and Board could find real estate
brokerage permissible for FHCs if they found it to be
complementary to a financial activity.12 9 For instance, FHCs are
able to assist in all aspects of buying a home but brokerage.3
Efficiency may be increased by allowing FHCs to engage in all
aspects of the process leading to lower prices for the consumer.1 3'
By filling the brokerage gap in the home purchasing continuum,
people and FHCs would be better off.1 32 Real estate brokerage
seems complementary to the business of title insurance,
homeowner's insurance, and mortgage loans which are all products
and services that FHCs are currently able to offer their
customers.1 33 This indicates the Secretary and Board should allow
FHCs to participate in the market. 3 1
Unlike real estate brokerage, real estate management is
less likely to be deemed financial in nature.'35 Day-to-day
activities of management are not as persuasively financial in
nature.136 Rather, they appear to be more of an administrative
function.137 If real estate brokerage were found to be financial in
nature by the Secretary and Board, real estate management may
be found to be either incidental to that activity or a complement to
it. 1 38 However, the day-to-day activities of management are more
like that of an owner, and under the current proposal, FHCs would
not be allowed to take title to any of the brokered real estate. 31
Hiring someone to maintain a piece of property as well as charging
and collecting rent is not easily recognized as incidental or
complementary to any financial activity including real estate
brokerage.14 ° It would not increase efficiency for the FHCs.'41
129. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2000).
130. See supra note 64-65 and accompanying text.
131. Id.
132- See generally supra note 65 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (2000).
139. Hammond, supra note 55, at 10.
140. But see Meyer, supra note 16. "[Commentators have stated that] many
aspects of real estate management are similar in nature to existing banking activities.
For example, collecting rental payments; maintaining security deposits; making
principal, interest, tax, and insurance payments; and providing periodic accountings
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Instead, it would merely be a new enterprise. 4"2 That is not the
goal of the GLBA.'
43
Another persuasive argument is that FHCs should be able
to conduct real estate brokerage activities and therefore "compete
effectively" with other companies providing financial services in
the United States including the real estate giants." "Real estate
agents admit their industry has made some inroads into banking,
with some large brokerages offering customers 'one-stop shops'--
real estate firms that have mortgage and insurance companies as
wholly owned subsidiaries. 14- It simply does not seem fair, FHCs
argue, that real estate brokers should be able to do everything
FHCs can do and more. 146 FHCs are not able to compete, and this
inefficiency is not good for consumers."' One effect of GLBA is
to promote growth of competition and spur innovation in the
banking industry. 4 ' Cutting FHCs out of the loop contradicts the
spirit of GLBA1
49
Lastly, experts believe allowing FHCs to engage in these
activities will not threaten the safety or security of the financial
industry. 5 ° Anti-tying rules would stop FHCs from forcibly
linking its products together to the detriment of the consumer,
FHCs are currently subject to more stringent privacy rules than
real estate firms,'5' and they would suffer no principal risk as an
agent/broker because FHCs have no ability to take title of the real
estate.
52
In sum, the Secretary and Board vill most likely determine
real estate brokerage to be financial in nature and list it as a
permissible activity for FHCs. 3 On the other hand, real estate
are functionally similar to collecting loan or lease payments, disbursing escrow
payments, and performing related accountings." Id. at 68.
14L See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
142. Id.
143. See 12 U.S.C. 1843(k) (2000).
144. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(3).
145. Roel, supra note 45, at C3.
146. OPEN THE DOOR, supra note 4.
147. Id.
148. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(3)(D)(ii);see id., § 1843(k)(D)(i).
149. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(3)(D)(iii); see id., § 143W(k)D)(i).
150. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
151. OPEN THE DOOR, supra note 4.
152. Hammond, supra note 55, at 10.
153. See supra notes 52-77 and accompanying text.
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management does not seem to be financial in nature, incidental to
a financial activity, or complementary to real estate brokerage.'
Therefore, it will probably not be added to the list. 55 A good
argument made by NAR against both proposed activities is "[t]he
safety and soundness of the U.S. economy should not be put at risk
by an untested regulation. We should move slowly when moving
in this direction."1 56 It will take time to realize the full effect of the
FHCs entrance into the insurance brokerage and finder's markets.
The argument that we should wait until the full impact on the
insurance market is studied is not without merit, but innovation
comes only from action. To move forward, the Secretary and
Board must be willing to accept some risk of the unknown.
HARRISON K. BISHOP
154. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
155. Id.
156. Institute of Real Estate Management, supra note 83.
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